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ABSTRACT
The Independent Lawyers’ Association of Myanmar (ILAM) is an
attempt to create an independent national bar association within
Myanmar. ILAM is a product of efforts by international entities such
as the International Bar Association (IBA) and domestic lawyers
throughout Myanmar to form a nation-wide bar association that
follows international ideas regarding a legal profession independent
of state control. The introduction of such ideas deviates from
Myanmar’s history, which placed lawyers under the control of the
state and made the legal system an instrument of authoritarian rule.
The growth of ILAM is a testament to legal reform currently taking
place in Myanmar, but it is also a mirror to the challenges of
transplanting international notions of an independent legal
profession into a formerly closed developing country emerging into
a larger global community. The experiences of ILAM offer insights
regarding theories of legal transplants, particularly for Gunther
Tuebner’s notion of a legal irritant. The analysis uses ILAM as a case
study to draw out implications regarding the nuances of legal
transplant theory and generate lessons for similar efforts elsewhere
to promote international ideas in local contexts.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Independent Lawyers’ Association of Myanmar (“ILAM”)
is a product of the International Bar Association (“IBA”) Human
Rights Initiative (“IBAHRI”) conducted in 2014-2016 in Myanmar,
the country formerly known as Burma. ILAM represents an
attempt to create an independent national bar association in terms
of being a nation-wide organization for the Myanmar legal
profession operating outside the control of the Myanmar state.1
Throughout its history under British colonial rule and postcolonial independence, Myanmar did not host an independent
national bar association. As a result, in advancing the development
of ILAM, the IBAHRI effectively sought to introduce some form of
an independent national bar association into Myanmar. As an
initiative of the IBA, the IBAHRI held to IBA perspectives regarding
the legal profession and so exemplified an attempted transmission
of international expectations for an independent national bar
association into a domestic context.
The discussion in the following sections treats the IBAHRI’s
efforts for ILAM as a case study involving a legal transplant of a
legal institution. The discussion analyzes the events surrounding
the creation of ILAM, not just as a testament to legal reform
currently taking place in Myanmar, but also as a mirror reflecting
the challenges facing aspirations of transplanting international
notions of legal institutions into a formerly closed developing
1. Myanmar, Capacity-Building 2014-2016, INT’L BAR ASS’N (Apr. 15, 2015),
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=B0DFF549-F0F3-4A9083D5-40B902FEDBF9 [https://perma.cc/EBV9-QNBT] [hereinafter IBA 2015b].
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country emerging into a larger global community. In doing so, the
analysis places ILAM within the context of the theoretical
discourse regarding legal transplants between Alan Watson and
Pierre Legrand, and asserts ILAM as a permutation of Gunther
Tuebner’s notion of a legal irritant. The analysis seeks to use the
case of ILAM to draw out implications regarding nuances of legal
transplant theory with a goal of improving its applicability for
similar cases elsewhere.
The discussion begins with a review of legal transplant theory
demarcating the major points of debate and the position of
Teubner’s notion of legal irritants. The discussion then turns to a
summary offering background regarding the IBAHRI’s work in the
formation of ILAM. This is subsequently followed by commentary
about the issues that arose in the course of the IBAHRI’s activities,
with attendant analysis of the significance of such issues for legal
transplant theory. A conclusion finishes the analysis with a
summary of the implications ILAM’s experiences pose for legal
transplant theory, a statement regarding applicability for other
situations similar to Myanmar involving the promotion of ideas
from an international level to local contexts, and a proposal for
future directions of research.
Methodologically, the analysis in the following sections is part
of an ongoing research project on the experiences of ILAM. The
discussion utilizes field research conducted during 2014-2017
involving observations of ILAM events, interviews with
participants in IBAHRI events regarding ILAM, and documents
made available by the IBA, ILAM, Myanmar government ministries,
and civil society organizations (“CSOs”). Due to the sensitivity of
the ongoing process of legal reforms in Myanmar—including
reforms for an independent national bar association—precautions
are taken to protect the institutions and individuals used for this
study. Such precautions pose a challenge since the limited number
of participants involved in the formation of ILAM increases the risk
of inference regarding identities. As a result, the analysis makes an
effort to avoid information that could be used to determine the
identities of participants associated with the formation of ILAM,
including affiliations with government offices, non-government
organizations, private entities, or any individual representatives.
In addition, direct quotes are avoided to prevent possible
inferences about the identity of the speakers. When possible, the
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analysis avoids interview data and makes use of documents
acquired through news media, internet sources, or in-person visits
to relevant government and civil society offices. The nature of the
risk is exemplified by the loss of U Ko Ni, a lawyer who served as a
prominent figure in the effort to create ILAM.2 U Ko Ni was
assassinated in January 2017,3 and his loss inflicted a blow to both
the advancement of ILAM and the movement for legal reform in
Myanmar. His death highlights the continuing dangers that persist
for Myanmar lawyers, the magnitude of the sensitivity tied to legal
reform in Myanmar, and the significance of the issues related to the
rule of law in Myanmar.
II. THEORY
The discourse on legal transplants predates the framework of
Alan Watson and Pierre LeGrand raised by Andrew Harding.4 In his
review of the concept of legal transplants,5 John Cairns finds the
first scholarly application of the term “transplants” in relation to
law occurring in a 1927 speech by Frederick P. Walton to the
International Academy of Comparative Law that addressed cases
where countries discarded their own legal heritage and adopted
foreign legal systems.6 The term persisted, with Cairns finding
examples from the 1930s in the works of R.W. Lee on the spread of
Roman-Dutch law to European colonies, Hermann Mannheim’s
study on the European adoption of juries in criminal trials from
England, and Henri Levy Ullmann’s observation of Turkey’s legal

2. IBAHRI Decries Fatal Shooting of Prominent Lawyer U Ko Ni in Myanmar and Calls
for
an
Investigation,
INT’L
BAR
ASS’N
(Jan.
31,
2017),
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=115d3918-3b50-4fef-b7ba3fa75dc680ab [https://perma.cc/U2LX-H5TG].
3. Ei Ei Toe Lwin & Shoon Naing, “The Death of the Rule of Law”: Coming to Terms
With
the
Loss
of
U
Ko
Ni,
M YANMAR T IMES
(Feb.
2,
2017),
https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/24784-the-death-of-the-rule-of-lawcoming-to-terms-with-the-loss-of-u-ko-ni.html [https://perma.cc/U8N5-DLCH]; Wai
Moe, U Ko Ni, A Prominent Muslim Lawyer in Myanmar, is Fatally Shot, N.Y. T IMES (Jan.
29, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jGmFSU [https://perma.cc/8VPP-7ZWP].
4. See generally ANDREW HARDING, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS IN EAST ASIA AND OCEANIA (2018)
[hereinafter Harding 2018].
5. See generally John Cairns, Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants,
41 G.A. J. INT’L & C OMP. L. 687 (2013) [hereinafter Cairns 2013].
6. Frederick Walton, The Historical School of Jurisprudence and Transplantations of
Law, 9 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 183 (1927).
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development.7 The metaphor of transplantation continued into the
1950s, with examples in B.A. Watley’s report on the 1950 Rome
UNIDROIT conference8 and C.J. Hamson’s summary of the
International 1955 Istanbul meeting for the Committee on
Comparative Law.9 Even at the time of Alan Watson’s seminal book
on Legal Transplants,10 the idea of legal transplants appeared
contemporaneously in Otto Kahn-Freund’s Chorley Lecture of
1973,11 John Beckstrom’s work on the transplantation of legal
systems from 1973,12 and Jean Rivero’s metaphor of medical organ
transplants to describe local imitation of foreign legal models from
1980.13 Hence, the term legal transplants and the corresponding
discourse over its meaning precede the more current tensions
between Watson and Legrand.
In conceptualizing legal transplants, there is a range of
approaches that help to clarify its implications. With respect to
Watson and LeGrand, Watson sees legal concepts as autonomous
from context and so readily transferable across different locations,
while LeGrand sees legal concepts as unique to each context and
hence wholly non-transferable from one place to another.14 In
contrast, Anna Dolidze describes legal transplants as being
horizontal in terms of a transnational diffusion of ideas between
states, or vertical in terms of ideas that are either diffused up from
domestic law to international law or diffused down from
international law to domestic law.15 An additional example is John
Gillespie, who views legal transplants from the perspective of
discourse analysis to identify the nature of power structures and
individual agency in communications and interactions in
7. Cairns 2013, supra note 5, at 694.
8. See generally B.A. Wortley, Report on the Rome Conference 1950, 32 J. COMP. LEGIS.
& INT’L L., 91 (1950).
9. C.J. Hamson, The Istanbul Conference of 1955, 5 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 26, 27 (1956).
10. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (1993) [hereinafter Watson 1993].
11. Id.
12. See generally John Beckstrom, Transplantation of Legal Systems, 21 AM. J. COM. L.
557 (1973).
13. Jean Rivero, Les Phenomnenes D’imitation des Modeles Etrangers en Droit
Administrative, 2 PAGES DE DOCTRINE 459 (1980).
14. Harding 2018, supra note 4; see also Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal
Transplants, M AASTRICHT J. COMP. L. 4(2), 111-24 (1997); Watson 1993, supra note 10.
15. Anna Dolidze, Bridging Comparative and International Law: Amicus Curiae
Participation as a Vertical Legal Transplant, 26 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 4, 851-80 (2016).
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lawmaking.16 Jonathan Miller sees legal transplants as falling into
one of several categories in a typology: cost-saving, where a drafter
of a law tries to save time and costs in experimentation by using a
solution employed elsewhere; externally-dictated, where
dominant foreign actors hold sufficient power to dictate the
adoption of foreign legal models in a country; entrepreneurial,
where domestic actors encourage the adoption of foreign legal
ideas in their own country; or legitimacy-generating, where
domestic actors seek to use prestigious foreign legal ideas to
bolster their domestic legitimacy.17 John Wise eschews the term
“transplant” because of its tendency to use a dichotomy of internal
versus external, and favors instead terms like “borrowing,”
“circulation,” and “diffusion” that reflect what he considers to be a
more accurate notion of general movements of ideas in cultural
networks operating independently of national borders.18 John
Gillespie, Sally Low, and Penelope Nicholson posit that the success
or failure of legal transfers is a function of social demand in
recipient countries, and so highlights the need by development
actors to listen to local experiences.19
While the perspectives on legal transplants are diverse, the
positions of Watson and Legrand present an interesting dynamic
in that they form a theoretical framework of opposing views about
the existential nature of legal transplants, with Watson’s position
accommodating the idea of legal transplants and Legrand’s
position rendering it impractical or at most inappropriate. Watson
and Legrand, in effect, represent the logical extremes of Otto KahnFreund’s conceptualization of a spectrum encompassing legal
institutions that are mechanical in the sense of being insulated
from culture versus legal institutions that are organic in the sense

16. See generally John Gillespie, Towards a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers
into Developing East Asia, 40 INT’L L. & P OL. 683 (2008).
17. Jonathan Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal
History, and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 A M. J. C OMP. L.
839-86 (2003).
18. Edward Wise, The Transplant of Legal Patterns, 38 A M. J. C OMP. L. Supplement:
1, 1-22 (1990).
19. Pip Nicholson & Sally Low, Local Accounts of Rule of Law Aid: Implications for
Donors, 5 H AGUE J. R ULE L. 1, 1-43 (2013); Penelope Nicholson & John Gillespie,
Interpreting Legal Transfers: The Implications for Law and Development, in LAW AND
D EVELOPMENT AND THE G LOBAL D ISCOURSES OF LEGAL T RANSFERS (2012).
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of being culturally embedded.20 Otto Kahn-Freund postulated that
more mechanical legal institutions are relatively easy to transfer
between cultures, while organic ones are more difficult to transfer
to alien cultures. More recent scholarship has sought a way
between Watson and Legrand, with scholars like Melissa Crouch
and David Nelken finding that the concept of legal transplants can
be useful in understanding the transnational spread of legal ideas
so long as it is qualified by some consideration of their association
with context.21
Gunther Teubner represents an additional alternative
between Watson and Legrand, which differs from Crouch and
Nelken in exercising a dialectical approach that interprets a legal
transplant as affecting change within a new context but also being
subject to change by the forces within it.22 Teubner, looking
beyond the Watson-Legrand dichotomy of integration or repulsion
of legal ideas across cultures, adopts the idea of legal irritants that
cause unexpected consequences via an “evolutionary dynamic in
which the external rule’s meaning will be reconstructed and the
internal context will undergo fundamental change.”23 Teubner
conceives of legal irritants as operating in two ways: (1) a legal
transformation, where a legal idea is recontextualized by new
conditions but may still be recognizable even though its legal
interpretation changes from the original; and (2) a social
transformation, where the recognition of a legal idea will cause
changes in a social system even as the idea is reconstructed by the
system. Teubner goes further to assert that these two processes
are inter-related in that they form a “circular co-evolutionary
dynamic” of “mutual irritations” upon each other that will
fundamentally alter the identity of the legal idea.24

20. Cairns 2013, supra note 5, at 643-45; Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of
Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 13 (1974); Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good
Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences, 61 M OD. L. R EV.
1, 11-32 (1998) [hereinafter Teubner 1998].
21. Melissa Crouch, Asian Legal Transplants and Rule of Law Reform: National
Human Rights Commission in Myanmar and Indonesia, 5 H AGUE J. R ULE L. 146-77
(2013); David Nelken, Legal Transplants and Beyond: of Disciplines and Metaphors, in
C OMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21 ST C ENTURY (2002).
22. Teubner 1998, supra note 20.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id. at 28.
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III. BACKGROUND
In relating legal transplant theory to the case of ILAM, it is
useful to review the IBAHRI program in Myanmar that led to the
formation of ILAM. Fact-finding reports from the IBA and
International Commission of Jurists (“ICJ”), subsequently
corroborated by scholarly reviews and independent studies, found
that the legal profession in Myanmar suffers from a history of
constraints upon its independence.25 In Myanmar, the legal
profession is divided into pleaders, who are licensed to practice in
civil and criminal matters in district and township courts, and
advocates, who are licensed to practice in all courts including the
Supreme Court.26 During the British colonial era, pleaders were
subject to the Legal Practitioners Act of 1879, which gave authority
for regulation, licensing, and discipline to the High Court of British
Burma,27 and advocates were subject to the Bar Council Act of
1929, which placed authority over rules, licenses, and discipline in
the High Court but made the High Court subject to the authority of
the Bar Council.28 The Bar Council was originally composed of
fifteen members chaired by the Attorney General and filled with
four nominees from the High Court and ten members elected by
25. See generally Melissa Crouch, The Layers of Legal Development in Myanmar, in
LAW, SOCIETY AND TRANSITION IN MYANMAR (2014); The Rule of Law in Myanmar: Challenges
and
Prospects,
INT’L
BAR
ASS’N
(2012),
available
at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=DE0EE11D-9878-4685A20F-9A0AAF6C3F3E [https://perma.cc/GM2D-GLU7] [hereinafter IBA 2012a]; Right to
Counsel: Independence of Lawyers in Myanmar, INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, (2013),
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/MYANMAR-Right-to-Counselelectronic.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C9C-6HVE] [hereinafter ICJ 2013]; Nang Yin Kham, An
Introduction to the Law and Judicial System of Myanmar, INT’L MARITIME ORG. (2014),
available
at
https://law.nus.edu.sg/cals/pdfs/wps/CALS-WPS-1402.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F39R-CHPY] [hereinafter Kham 2014].
26. Bar Council Act of 1929 (Union of the Republic of Myanmar 1929), available
at: https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Myanmar-Bar-Council-Actand-amendments-legislation-1926-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/297F-6HL6]
[hereinafter Bar Council Act 1929]; Courts Manual of 1999 (Myanmar Supreme Court
1999), available at: http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs14/Courts_Manual-ocren.pdf [https://perma.cc/B36G-CWBX] [hereinafter Courts Manual 1999]; Legal
Practioners Act of 1879 (Myanmar Constitutional Tribunal 1879), available at:
https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Myanmar-Legal-Practitioners-Actlegislation-1879-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/74LZ-VJPS ] [hereinafter Legal Practitioners
Act 1879].
27. Legal Practitioners Act 1879, supra note 26, at sec. 6.
28. Bar Council Act 1929, supra note 26, at sec. 15; Courts Manual 1999, supra note
26, at part 1, sec. 1-2.
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practicing advocates.29 This arrangement continued into postindependence through much of the military era until 1989, when
the Bar Council was amended to have eleven members comprised
of the Attorney General as Chair, Deputy Attorney General as ViceChair, the Director-General of the Attorney General’s Office as
Secretary, a Supreme Court Judge nominated by the Chief Justice,
the Director-General of the Supreme Court, and six advocates
chosen by the Supreme Court.30 Myanmar’s judicial system places
the High Court at the administrative state or region level and the
Supreme Court at the national level,31 so the Bar Council Act
Amendment of 1989 served to centralize control over the country’s
lawyers within national state authority. There were local bar
associations entirely separate from the Myanmar state, with
examples such as the Yangon Bar Association, Mandalay Bar
Association, and Mon Bar Association, but these never held powers
to regulate the legal profession and were denied legal registration
when the State Law and Order Restoration Council (“SLORC”)
seized power.32 These entities continue to exist, but as local bar
associations without the power to regulate the legal profession,
they fall short of the ideal for an independent national bar
association.
In such a context, ILAM is an attempt to rectify the lack of an
independent legal profession in Myanmar and reflects a number of
separate but related efforts involving the IBA, the Myanmar
government, and pre-existing Myanmar regional bar associations
and lawyer groups. Covering the years 2014-2016, the IBAHRI
program sought to (1) gather support in Myanmar for a national
bar association, (2) establish and build capacity for a national bar
association as a legally registered independent professional body,
and (3) encourage reforms regarding the legal profession allowing
an independent national bar association.33 The program came in
the wake of prior exploratory activities by the IBA in Myanmar
29. Bar Council Act 1929, supra note 26.
30. Bar Council Act Amendment of 1989 (Union of the Republic of Myanmar
1989), available at: https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/MyanmarBar-Council-Act-and-amendments-legislation-1926-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7A23-Z5K5] [hereinafter Bar Council Act Amendment 1989]; Courts
Manual 1999, supra note 26.
31. Kham 2014, supra note 25.
32. IBA 2012a, supra note 25; ICJ 2013, supra note 25.
33. IBA 2015b, supra note 1.
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which included an August 2012 fact-finding mission that led to a
December 2012 report and subsequent January 2013 panel to
discuss the state of rule-of-law in Myanmar.34 The impetus for IBA
efforts in regards to an independent national bar association in
Myanmar grew with a July 2013 scoping mission that assessed the
ways in which the IBA could aid reform in support of the legal
profession.35 It was after the scoping mission that the IBA
committed to promoting through its IBAHRI an independent
national bar association in Myanmar.
For its part, beginning in 2014, the IBAHRI program oversaw
a series of events that progressed towards the formation of ILAM.
In partnership with the Myanmar Parliament’s Committee on Law
and Tranquility, which was led by its Chair Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,
the IBAHRI hosted a February 2014 seminar in the capital of
Naypidaw addressing international standards for bar
associations.36 Accompanied by a report on the roles of bar
associations, the seminar assembled international experts and
Myanmar stakeholders to discuss globally accepted best practices
for bar associations, different models for bar associations, and
generate recommendations for the reform of Myanmar’s legal
profession.37 The outcomes of the seminar included a statement to
form an independent national bar association for Myanmar and the
assembly of a steering committee to lead a national effort towards

34. Panel Discussion—The Rule of Law in Myanmar: Challenges and Prospects, INT’L
BAR
ASS’N
(2013),
available
at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=c68828b3-9c10-48a7-a1c7f5d394b63cc9 [https://perma.cc/Y6US-DKBH]; Myanmar/Burma Fact-finding Mission,
INT’L
BAR
ASS’N
(2012),
available
at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=DEBA1058-8D8D-47E3B8DB-1BA2BA82E40E [https://perma.cc/4YUS-NQW7].
35. Myanmar/Burma Country Visit 2013., INT’L BAR ASS’N (2013), available at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=7481efba-7855-4bd2-9af77cf71fe1ab43 [https://perma.cc/D2SN-RCX4].
36. Myanmar: Major Legal Seminar on Bar Associations’ Best Practices to be Hosted by
IBAHRI,
INT’L
BAR
ASS’N
(2014f),
available
at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=ce33cd81-eb78-4209-9ca28a9338c17327 [https://perma.cc/D3KE-46KT] [hereinafter IBA 2014f].
37. Understanding Bar Associations and Their Roles and Responsibilities, INT’L BAR
ASS’N
(2014e),
available
at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=6a0a6d72-09ef-49768cec-df30c9674f05 [https://perma.cc/JJ2T-VJ9T] [hereinafter Understanding Bar
Associations].
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that goal.38 The steering committee, composed of representatives
from Myanmar’s regional bar associations and lawyer groups, held
three meetings over the course of 2014 to draft a constitution for
an independent national bar association.39 Concurrent to the
steering committee meetings, in conjunction with Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi and the Myanmar Parliament’s Committee on Rule of Law
and Tranquility, the IBAHRI held an October 2014 workshop on
reform of Myanmar laws regarding the legal profession. The
workshop provided a comparative review of laws from other
countries with discussions on enacting Myanmar legislation more
consistent with international standards for the regulation of
lawyers.40
The work of the steering committee led to a general assembly
in March 2015 to endorse a draft constitution for an independent,
representative national bar association that would be called
ILAM.41 In support of ILAM, the IBAHRI held fifteen workshops
throughout the various states and administrative regions of
Myanmar to prepare the first elections for ILAM’s leadership.42 The
elections were held in September 2015,43 and in January 2016, the
IBA, along with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, opened the inaugural
38. Myanmar’s Legal Profession Moves to Establish a National Bar Association, INT’L
BAR
ASS’N
(2014d),
available
at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=4670e898-428b-440db986-52b35593d40d [https://perma.cc/9UPJ-CTDZ].
39. Myanmar Lawyers Advance in Mission to Build a Representative National Bar
Association,
INT’L
BAR
ASS’N
(2014c),
available
at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=2efce9cc-5ef9-4dde-86e4024648d54b93 [https://perma.cc/UNR8-RKK7] [hereinafter Myanmar Lawyers
Advance].
40. Laws Regulating the Legal Profession: A Comparative Review from Around the
World,
INT’L
BAR
ASS’N
(2014a),
available
at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=14490A0D-F6C4-4E12AE48-A4D730D0CDE4 [https://perma.cc/9ENH-DYWC] [hereinafter A Comparative
Review]; Myanmar: IBAHRI Host Workshop on Laws Governing Legal Profession with Daw
Aung
San
Suu
Kyi
(2014b),
INT’L
BAR
ASS’N
available
at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=5d4e7549-e00e-46ed-8c4c2a0c421db55a [https://perma.cc/L4L4-WZKM].
41. IBAHRI and Myanmar Lawyers Prepare for First Independent Lawyers’ Association
Elections
(2015a),
INT’L
BAR
ASS’N
available
at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=96554c4d-8391-4f109955-d5c1ba10f019 [https://perma.cc/W32Y-X9NE] [hereinafter IBAHRI and Myanmar
Lawyers Prepare].
42. Id.
43. Id.
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meeting of ILAM.44 At its first meeting, ILAM’s Central Committee
adopted its constitution, elected a Central Executive Committee,
and set an agenda for committees and attendant action plans.45 The
IBA maintained its presence during the remainder of 2016, with
IBA representatives participating in ILAM events later in the
year.46 ILAM became a legally registered entity in November
2016,47 effectively marking the culmination of the IBAHRI’s threeyear program in Myanmar.
A number of observations should be noted regarding the
IBAHRI program for ILAM. First, the work of the IBAHRI should not
be construed as the only effort in Myanmar for an independent bar
association. The IBA’s three-year program for the IBAHRI was
driven in part by a desire to instigate progress on an issue that the
IBA perceived as suffering from a lack of action by local actors.48
The accuracy of such sentiments, however, is uncertain in that the
IBAHRI’s program overlaid pre-existing endemic efforts within
Myanmar for a nation-wide bar association independent of state
control. For example, organizations in Myanmar’s various
administrative regions such as the Yangon Bar Association,
Mandalay Bar Association, and Mon Bar Association in the time
prior to the IBAHRI’s arrival had sought in various ways to lead
their own diverse campaigns for their respective conceptions of an
independent national association of lawyers.49 In addition, at the
time of the IBA’s activities in 2012 and 2013, there had been
ongoing efforts to promote a Myanmar Lawyers’ Association
(“MLA”) sometimes also called the Myanmar Lawyers’ Network or
MLN) and a Myanmar Legal Aid Network (“MLAN”).50 As part of
44. IBA President and Aung San Suu Kyi Open Inaugural Meeting of Myanmar’s First
National Independent Lawyers’ Association, INT’L BAR ASS’N (2016b), available at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=67923557-0f67-403c-ad67ff04adc4ac52 [https://perma.cc/AQ6Z-8427].
45. Id.
46. Myanmar Lawyers Attend Workshop Promoting Legal Ethics. (2016a), INT’L BAR
ASS’N available at: https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=aaf379c9100a-4403-b06b-ca659db6646f [https://perma.cc/3FEZ-GGSE].
47. Independent Lawyers’ Association of Myanmar (ILAM), available at:
http://www.ilam.org.mm/en/pages/1 [https://perma.cc/GB65-CJYP] [hereinafter cited
as ILAM 2017].
48. Interviews IBA 2014; Interviews IBA 2015; Interviews IBA 2016.
49. Interviews ILAM 2015.
50. Nick Cheesman & Kyaw Min San, Not Just Defending; Advocating for Law in
Myanmar, 31 WIS. INT’L L. J. 718-19 (2014).
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their respective organizational purposes, both the MLA and MLAN
held goals similar to the IBA’s aspiration to advocate for an
independent bar and reform of laws regarding the legal
profession.51 The MLA had gone so far as to convene its first
meeting in June 2012 and MLAN had used its connections to the
South East Asia Legal Aid Network to hold workshops throughout
2012.52 As a result, the notion of an independent bar association in
Myanmar was not unique to the IBA, such that the work of the
IBAHRI actually represented an introduction of an additional
foreign presence to a domestic space of local actors espousing
different interpretations of the same idea.
Second, the activities of the IBAHRI were not without tension
in relation to domestic Myanmar perspectives. The tensions
between IBAHRI and local perspectives manifested themselves in
multiple ways. For example, the introduction of the IBAHRI’s
program over pre-existing local efforts for an independent national
bar association appeared to some Myanmar actors as an effort to
supplant a foreign actor over domestic perspectives.53 IBAHRI
representatives asserted that the program was a Myanmar-driven
initiative that sought to be inclusive in its approach by involving
representatives of lawyer organizations from Myanmar’s various
administrative regions, but the sentiments over foreign intrusion
extended to the IBAHRI’s seminars and workshops. In particular,
some Myanmar attendees in the IBAHRI’s 2014 events saw them
as being controlled by foreign experts following an agenda that
was unresponsive to local concerns and which impeded initiatives
of Myanmar participants to further those concerns.54 These
perceptions may have arisen from the nature of IBAHRI’s program,
which sought to balance IBA desires for the inclusion of diverse
local perspectives, both from Myanmar government and civil
society, while still conforming to IBA goals to promote
international standards for the legal profession. The IBAHRI’s
compromise, however, was still perceived by a number of
Myanmar participants in the February 2014 seminar and October
2014 workshop as weighted against Myanmar perspectives since
(1) many, if not the majority, of seminar participants were experts
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Interviews ILAM 2015; Interviews ILAM 2016; Interviews ILAM 2017.
Interviews ILAM 2015; Interviews ILAM 2016; Interviews ILAM 2017.
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from the West rather than Asia, and hence were perceived as being
less responsive to the contextual challenges in Myanmar, and (2)
much, if not most, of the seminar, seemed to be more focused on
instruction delivered by Western experts to Myanmar participants,
rather than being a collaborative endeavor involving Myanmar
actors in the development of an action plan affecting their
interests.55
The disjuncture between IBAHRI and Myanmar views carried
over into the 2014 steering committee meetings for ILAM. Some
Myanmar participants indicated an appreciation for the presence
of the IBA because of its international stature and attendant
capacity to muster consultative resources, legitimacy with
domestic and foreign actors, and approval from the Myanmar state,
but they also noted that the IBA’s stature pushed IBA goals at the
expense of local concerns.56 Myanmar participants perceived
IBAHRI activities as adhering to a “checklist” of preferences
invariably tied to IBA conceptions of international standards for
the legal profession.57 This contrasted with local desires to
structure the organization and procedures of ILAM in a way that
could alleviate discontent from potentially competing for preexisting domestic efforts to create an independent national bar
association and appease the concerns of potentially obstructive
actions from Myanmar government concerned about the threat of
ILAM to government authority.58 The division, in essence, reflected
a divergence between foreign IBA interests ostensibly advancing
international ideals versus local Myanmar interests seeking to
respond to local political realities. The tensions arose over
perceptions that, in the formation of ILAM, the IBAHRI was
directing the agenda to favor IBA ideals without regard for local
realities.

55. Interviews ILAM 2015; Interviews ILAM 2016.
56. Interviews ILAM 2015; Interviews ILAM 2016.
57. IBA International Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession, INT’L BAR ASS’N
(2011),
available
at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=1730FC33-6D70-44699B9D-8A12C319468C [https://perma.cc/M6F5-KWNF]; IBA Standards for the
Independence of the Legal Profession, INT’L BAR ASS’N (1990), available at:
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=F68BBBA5-FD1F-426F9AA5-48D26B5E72E7 [https://perma.cc/964C-GXRU].
58. Interviews ILAM 2015.
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Third, the conclusion of the IBAHRI program did not
represent the conclusion of ILAM’s formation. As of November
2018, the status of ILAM was still unfinished in several respects. To
begin with, representatives of ILAM’s leadership observe that the
organization is not fixed and that it will continue to evolve in
response to the needs of its constituency and changes in
Myanmar’s regulation of the legal profession.59 For example, the
ILAM constitution was amended in December 2017 and is subject
to further amendments in the future.60 In addition, the nature of
ILAM is not assured. While ILAM may be independent in terms of
being outside state control, it is not independent in terms of being
self-sufficient. ILAM relies upon membership revenues,61 and so
must justify its membership dues to a market of Myanmar lawyers
whose financial resources are constrained by Myanmar’s economic
underdevelopment.
Further, ILAM is not a sole actor, as the bar associations and
lawyer organizations present at the start of the IBAHRI program
continue to operate. While the IBAHRI sought to include these
entities in the formation of ILAM, their persistence as concurrent
entities means that ILAM must find a way to justify its presence
alongside their presence to the same community of Myanmar
lawyers. This requires that ILAM identify a role that differentiates
ILAM from Myanmar’s other bar associations and lawyer
organizations to a degree sufficient to garner enough membership
dues to sustain ILAM’s existence.62 In addition, ILAM’s role is
uncertain. ILAM seeks to justify its existence to Myanmar lawyers
not just in terms of its distinction from other bar associations or
lawyer organizations but also in terms of its base value. For
example, in an attempt to match the powers of independent bar
associations in other countries, ILAM sought a role in legal
education. This effort, however, was rejected by Myanmar
universities.63 Because of the Bar Council Act, ILAM lacks the
authority of comparable independent bar associations in other
countries to control licensing, standards, or discipline of the legal
profession. As a result, as of November 2018, ILAM has sought to
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Interviews ILAM Secretariat 2017.
Id.
Id.
Interviews ILAM Secretariat 2017.
Interviews ILAM Secretariat 2017.
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orient its activities around an agenda that includes skills training
for practicing lawyers, advocacy on behalf of the legal profession,
promotion of pro bono services, certification of quality standards,
and liaison with international organizations.64 These functions,
however, are subject to change as a matter of supporting ILAM’s
future existence.
Last, the formation of ILAM was tied to an attendant IBAHRI
goal of reforming Myanmar’s laws to reduce state control over the
legal profession. As much as ILAM is outside state control,
Myanmar’s legal profession continues to be held under state
authority by the constraints of the Bar Council Act of 1929 and the
Bar Council Act Amendment of 1989. While the Myanmar
government has acknowledged the IBAHRI’s call for reform of the
two acts to reduce the power of the Bar Council over Myanmar’s
lawyers, the government as of November 2018 has not amended
the acts or pursued further change in Myanmar’s laws regarding
the legal profession.65 As a result, ILAM is still advocates for
powers held by independent bar associations in other countries
regarding the regulation of the legal profession.66
IV. ILAM AS A LEGAL TRANSPLANT
The work of the IBAHRI in nurturing the formation of ILAM
exhibits a number of nuances with implications for Tuebner’s
conception of legal transplants: the distinction between an
institution versus an idea in the transplant of a legal concept, the
different motivations driving divergent interpretations of a
transplanted idea, and the proportionality of the dialectic between
legal and social transformation. In making comments on each, it is
useful to highlight particular elements in the events tied to the rise
of ILAM. The association between nuances and respective events is
discussed individually below.

64. Interviews ILAM Secretariat 2017.
65. Aung Kyaw Min, Move to Amend Bar Law Gains Steam, MYANMAR TIMES (May 26,
2018),
https://www.mmtimes.com/news/move-amend-bar-law-gains-steam.html
[https://perma.cc/BJP8-Z9SN].
66. Id.
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A. Transplant of an Institution Versus an Idea
To begin with, a discussion of ILAM within the framework of
legal transplants should be conducted with a distinction between
a transplant of a legal institution versus a transplant of a legal
idea.67 The efforts of the IBAHRI program involved different
components, with the IBAHRI’s pursuit of ILAM as an organization
being an institutional expression of an idea regarding an
independent national bar association.68 The distinction is relevant
because it points to a source for the tensions between the IBA and
Myanmar actors in the formation of ILAM.69 The IBAHRI program
was launched in the space of pre-existing local bar associations and
lawyer organizations which had been engaged in their own
respective efforts to create an independent national bar
association before the instigation of the IBAHRI.70 This means that
in its basic form, the notion of an independent national bar
association was already being held in principle by Myanmar actors
prior to the arrival of the IBA.71 In addition, it was also accepted by
the Myanmar state, with both the government before the 2015
election and the government after the 2015 election supporting the
concept of a nationwide bar association outside of state control.72
As a result, the issues raised by Myanmar actors with the IBAHRI
program were less about the IBAHRI’s work to promote a legal idea
and more about the IBAHRI’s agenda to implant a legal institution.
For its part, the IBAHRI program held to a goal of fostering a
Myanmar-led movement, but Myanmar participants in the
program indicated issues with regard to (1) the relationship
between ILAM and ongoing local efforts for an independent
national bar association, and (2) the differences between IBA and
local preferences for the organizational composition of ILAM in
structure, procedures, and agenda. With respect to the relationship
between ILAM and local efforts, the IBAHRI program sought to
encourage a pluralist process inclusive of pre-existing bar
associations and lawyer organizations in Myanmar.73 This did not,
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

IBA 2014f, supra note 36.
Understanding Bar Associations, supra note 37.
Myanmar Lawyers Advance, supra note 39.
IBAHRI and Myanmar Lawyers Prepare, supra note 41.
Interviews IBA 2014.
Cheesman & Min San, supra note 50.
Interviews IBA 2014; Interviews IBA 2015; Interviews IBA 2016.
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however, result in Myanmar legal actors subsuming their efforts
for their own respective plans for an independent national bar
association. Rather, they supported the creation of ILAM to the
extent that it existed concurrent with ongoing local lawyer
organizations. With respect to the differences between IBA and
local preferences for ILAM itself, Myanmar participants in the
IBAHRI program noted the IBA’s disapproval of the drafts of the
ILAM constitution, with the IBAHRI’s insistence on IBA articulation
of international standards for bar associations being seen by
Myanmar participants as conflicting with the work of Myanmar
actors on the ILAM constitution.74 Specifically, IBA preferences
were for an egalitarian structure that favored qualities such as
decentralized authority, collective decision-making, direct
elections of executives, and inclusive opportunities that proactively sought the participation of women and youth in leadership
positions.75 In contrast, Myanmar members of the ILAM
constitution’s steering committee sought a hierarchical
organization with centralized authority, leadership tied to
seniority and experience, and an aversion or delay in diversity
initiatives.76
Myanmar participants had attempted to engage with the
IBAHRI program over such differences but argued that the IBA
directed the IBAHRI agenda in ways that afforded little room to
address local concerns. The disjuncture between the IBA and
Myanmar participants in the IBAHRI program were great enough
that Myanmar legal actors felt compelled to hold their own
discussions informally independent of the IBAHRI to demarcate
their positions relative to the IBA on both the question of ILAM’s
relationship with concurrent local efforts for an independent
national bar association and ILAM’s composition as an
organization.77 Ultimately, their positions turned to essentially
making ILAM indeterminate, with ILAM left to define its own role
among existing bar associations and lawyer organizations and
ILAM having a constitution that would initially adhere to Myanmar
preferences but would be subject to potential later amendments.78
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Interviews ILAM 2015; Interviews ILAM 2016.
Interviews IBA 2014; Interviews IBA 2015; Interviews IBA 2016.
Interviews ILAM 2015; Interviews ILAM 2016; Interviews ILAM 2017.
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Such a scenario suggests that the changes foreseen by
Tuebner’s conception of legal irritants do not always result in an
identifiable transformation, at least in the sense of being a
transformation with a conclusion.79 Teubner sees legal irritants as
spurring an evolutionary dynamic in which an external idea is
reconstructed and an internal context is changed in responding to
the external idea.80 As much as the IBAHRI’s work to develop ILAM
was an external idea of the IBA spurring movement internal to
Myanmar, it did not lead entirely to reconstruction or internal
change.81 Myanmar legal actors agreed with the IBA on the idea of
an independent national bar association and engaged with the
IBAHRI to advance the idea.82 As a result, the issues were less about
reconstruction and more acceptance of ILAM as the institutional
representation of a shared idea.83 The formation of ILAM, however,
fomented limited internal change among Myanmar legal actors, in
that (1) local bar associations and lawyer organizations continued
to exist concurrent to ILAM, (2) the Myanmar government did not
change the laws regarding the legal profession, and (3) ILAM did
not achieve the goal of an independent national bar association.84
It is possible to place the IBAHRI and ILAM as expressions of
unexpected consequences that Teubner expects to arise from legal
irritants, but their experiences do not entirely reflect the changes
in external ideas or internal contexts he envisioned.85 It is possible
to resolve such apparent inconsistency by noting that the state of
both the idea of an independent national bar association and the
institution of ILAM is not resolved, with both still part of ongoing,
unfinished efforts to advance them in Myanmar. As a result, neither
status is static, suggesting that they are still undergoing the
evolutionary dynamic posed by Teubner. In this case, the IBAHRI’s
work to form ILAM should be seen as demonstrating an
interpretation of Tuebner’s legal irritants as involved in a
continual, ongoing evolutionary dynamic that should not be
expected to end.86
79. See generally Crouch, supra note 21.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

IBA 2015b, supra note 1.
IBA 2014f, supra note 36.
Understanding Bar Associations, supra note 37.
Myanmar Lawyers Advance, supra note 39.
IBAHRI and Myanmar Lawyers Prepare, supra note 41.
Cheesman & Min San, supra note 50.
Id.
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B. Motivations Underlying Divergent Interpretations
The disjuncture between IBA and Myanmar perspectives in
the IBAHRI program reflected differences in motivations.87 It is
useful to recognize these differences since they identify another
source of tension in the formation of ILAM.88 In instigating a project
for an independent national bar association in the midst of preexisting local efforts for the same idea, the IBAHRI program sought
to provide IBA support for a concept that it perceived as suffering
from a lack of local action.89 The IBAHRI program was not directed
solely towards technical support, since it also provided alternative
means of support in the form of consultation and advocacy for
Myanmar participants and Myanmar government towards
international standards for bar associations.90 The Myanmar
participants in the IBAHRI program acknowledged that in the
decades of Myanmar’s isolation, their respective efforts had
struggled to coalesce into substantive progress against the
Myanmar state.91 They also recognized the value of support from
an international organization with the stature of the IBA, in that as
an international entity with an established global reputation for
advocacy on legal issues the IBA had the legitimacy to (1) muster
international donors to provide financial support for legal reform
efforts such as ILAM, (2) assemble international expertise in
forums convening foreign and local actors for networking, agendasetting, discussion, and training; (3) supersede existing local
conflicts between rival voices—both between and amongst state
and non-state actors—regarding the idea of an independent
national bar and work to provoke a common forum for contending
local actors; and (4) nurture support from the Myanmar state for
progress towards an independent national bar association.92
Such recognition, however, did not avert the tensions
between the IBA and the Myanmar perspectives regarding ILAM.
The agenda of the IBAHRI program and its preferences for ILAM
were a reflection of the IBA’s purpose as a global advocate
promoting international standards for the legal profession. As a
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Understanding Bar Associations, supra note 37.
A Comparative Review, supra note 40.
IBAHRI and Myanmar Lawyers Prepare, supra note 41
Interviews IBA 2014; Interviews IBA 2015; Interviews IBA 2016.
Interviews ILAM 2016.
Interviews ILAM 2016.

2020]

INDEPENDENT LAWYERS’ ASSOCIATION

1153

result, despite its goals for a Myanmar-led movement, the IBAHRI
program also sought to advance IBA priorities in keeping with IBA
ideals for an independent national bar association.93 In contrast,
the concerns of Myanmar participants in the program were tied to
the potential challenges posed by both pre-existing domestic legal
actors with their respective interests and a Myanmar state that had
historically denied independence to the legal profession.94 These
concerns have not abated: even with the formal inauguration of
ILAM, the pre-existing local efforts for independent bar
associations continued, and the Myanmar state did not change the
status quo in its laws to allow an independent bar association. As a
result, in drafting the ILAM constitution the members of the
steering committee diverged from the IBA’s priorities and instead
held to concerns they saw as necessary to address such local
realities.95 This meant mitigating potential dangers by leaving
ILAM indeterminate in role or composition such that it had the
flexibility to exercise pragmatic actions to ensure its survival. This
included having the initial constitution for ILAM subordinate
diversity initiatives in lieu of a hierarchical management structure
that appeased local legal actors by offering positions of authority
to their senior leadership.
For Teubner, the issues in differing motivations offer further
depth in the study of legal irritants. In identifying the interests
driving the behavior of actors involved in the evolutionary
dynamic of external idea and internal context, the attention to
motivation also helps to highlight the character of such a dynamic
in terms of its contentiousness.96 In the case of ILAM, sympathetic
interests for the idea of an independent national bar association
led to engagement by Myanmar legal actors—both the government
and non-state entities—in the IBAHRI, while divergent interests
with respect to ILAM as the organizational expression of that idea
led to tensions regarding the composition of ILAM and left
uncertainties in its role in the Myanmar legal landscape.97 Even as
much as these outcomes continue to be unresolved, they suggest
that the changes, whether upon an external idea or an internal
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

IBA 2015b, supra note 1.
IBA International Principles on Conduct, supra note 55.
Interviews ILAM 2015.
See generally Crouch, supra note 24.
Interviews ILAM 2015; Interviews ILAM 2016.
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context, spurred by a legal irritant can vary in character, with the
nature of change affected by the alignment of interests among the
various external and internal agents of change. Following the
experiences of the IBAHRI and ILAM, in areas where motivations
are parallel the character of change is relatively tranquil, but in
areas where motivations are divergent the character of change is
more contentious.
C. Proportionality in the Dialectic Between Legal and Social
Transformation
The formation of ILAM arguably represented Teubner’s
conception of a legal transplant via a legal irritant. The IBAHRI
program can be construed as an irritant that motivated action
among Myanmar legal actors towards the idea of an independent
national bar association.98 Teubner saw the process of irritation as
involving a mechanism that affected change within a local context
but which was also affected by that context.99 The creation of ILAM
was consistent with this, in the sense that the IBAHRI program
sought to follow IBA ideals for an independent national bar
association but was affected by Myanmar participants to produce
an ILAM that reflected local concerns.100
Teubner, however, also saw irritation as having two
components: legal transformation and social transformation, with
the two involved in a circular co-evolutionary dynamic. Such a
conception suggests a proportional dialectic, as much between law
and society, as it is between foreign and domestic.101 The
development of ILAM diverges from this. The ulterior motive of the
IBAHRI program was to install an independent national bar
association in Myanmar.102 ILAM, however, offers only an
incomplete step towards this goal. ILAM is an organization for
Myanmar’s lawyers operating outside state control, but the
possibility of an independent national bar association that is fully
capable of regulating the legal profession continues to be limited
by the Myanmar Bar Council Act of 1929 and its Amendment of

98. Crouch, supra note 21, at 28.
99. IBA 2015b, supra note 1.
100. IBA International Principles on Conduct, supra note 56.
101. Bar Council Act 1929, supra note 26.
102. Bar Council Act Amendment 1989, supra note 30.
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1989.103 As a result, the achievement of IBA ideals in Myanmar
requires a change in Myanmar law that amends or supersedes the
status quo. The lack of such change suggests that the development
of ILAM falls short of Teubner’s expectation for legal
transformation.
As much as ILAM may fall short with respect to legal
transformation, however, it arguably does represent a measure of
social transformation. The IBAHRI program occurred within a
social space constituted by the Myanmar government, bar
associations, and lawyer organizations and IBA associates.104 In
driving its agenda, the IBAHRI program influenced the actors in the
social space by advancing the idea of an independent national bar
association.105 The idea existed in Myanmar prior to the instigation
of the IBAHRI, but the program served as a catalyst that assembled
the disparate actors and focused their efforts on a common
process.106 As a result, it changed the social system of Myanmar
legal actors by coalescing their efforts into a collective activity,
such that there was engagement between Myanmar legal actors,
the Myanmar state, and foreign experts.107 Such engagement was
constructive, as it led to a native Myanmar agenda that altered the
formation of ILAM away from IBA preferences. In doing so, the
creation of ILAM reflected Teubner’s conception of a social
transformation wherein an idea such as an independent national
bar association spurs changes in a social system even as the idea is
changed by that system.
The disparity in the development of ILAM between the
components of legal transformation and social transformation
serves to qualify Teubner’s conception of legal transplants, in that
it indicates the co-evolutionary dynamic posed by Teubner is not
necessarily equal between legal and social changes. Rather, the
case of ILAM demonstrates a legal transplant that so far has been
led by a social transformation for the goal of producing an eventual
legal transformation. The experiences of the IBAHRI program in
the creation of ILAM suggest that a legal irritant may cause legal
and social transformation, but that the two processes are not
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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necessarily proportional, such that change can be skewed towards
one over the other. Teubner’s notion of a legal irritant, in other
words, is not purely represented by cases involving concurrent
legal and social components but can encompass scenarios where
irritation is driven by an unequal balance between the two.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The preceding sections used the IBAHRI’s work to develop
ILAM as a case exemplifying an attempted legal transplant of
international expectations for an independent national bar
association into a domestic Myanmar context. The analysis used
the events associated with the formation of ILAM to draw insights
regarding nuances in Teubner’s notion of legal irritants. As a
process separate from state authority promoting a legal institution
outside of state control, the IBAHRI’s work on ILAM represents an
attempted legal transplant via non-state processes. The nature of
ILAM’s experiences, however, highlight contextual factors in
Myanmar that indicate a basis for several interventions in
Teubner’s conception of legal transplant theory: (1) Teubner’s idea
of legal irritants driving an evolutionary dynamic fostering
reconstruction of an external legal concept and transformation of
an internal context is not something that necessarily culminates
with definable change, but can instead in cases like ILAM
continue—potentially in perpetuity—without a clearly identifiable
end and with uncertain manifestations of change; (2) Teubner’s
sense of an evolutionary dynamic can exhibit character in terms of
the levels of contention associated with reconstruction of an
external idea and transformation of local context, with the
development of ILAM demonstrating how divergent views among
foreign and local actors drove the tensions associated with the
IBAHRI’s work behind ILAM; and (3) Teubner’s perspective of legal
irritants encompassing both legal and social change does not
necessarily entail an equal measure of both, since ILAM’s
experiences demonstrate a case more reflective of social
transformation and less reflective of legal transformation, with the
latter being left as a potential future prospect.
Beyond theory, the case of ILAM proffers insights for other
situations involving attempts to transplant legal ideas from an
international level to local contexts. To begin, the experiences of
ILAM indicate the extent to which local factors within a given
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context can affect the work of foreign actors to promote
international ideals. In particular, as much as the IBAHRI sought to
create an independent national bar association consistent with IBA
expectations such as decentralized authority, collective decisionmaking, direct elections of executives, and leadership
opportunities for women and youth, the Myanmar participants
working within the IBAHRI activities for ILAM produced an
organization favoring centralized authority, leadership tied to
seniority and experience, and a postponement in diversity
initiatives. Such a divergence shows how local actors, even ones
that share with foreign entities ideas for legal institutions like an
independent national bar association, can exert themselves in
ways that alter the efforts of international aid away from their
original aspirations. As demonstrated by the case of ILAM, local
actors possess their own interests and perspectives and have the
ability to exercise them—even when working in concert with
foreign voices in mechanisms like the IBAHRI—in ways that
generate outcomes that differ from international ideals.
In addition, the experience of ILAM indicates the need for
greater scope in pursuing a legal transplant of international ideas
into a local context. ILAM resulted from IBAHRI efforts to create an
independent national bar association, but the manifestation of
ILAM as an organization was not by itself sufficient to establish IBA
aspirations for an independent national bar association in
Myanmar. The shortfall was not due entirely to the dynamics of
foreign and local actors involved in the formation of ILAM: during
the time of the IBAHRI initiative for ILAM Myanmar’s political
environment accommodated the creation and existence of
organizations like ILAM, but the body of Myanmar laws host an
environment that adheres to historical restrictions on the idea of
an independent national bar association. The Bar Council Act of
1929 and the Bar Council Act Amendment of 1989 collectively
maintain centralized control over Myanmar’s lawyers under the
Attorney General’s Office and Supreme Court. As a result, while
ILAM may be a national association for lawyers independent of the
Myanmar state, it does not have the power of bar associations in
other countries to regulate the legal profession, and so leaves
Myanmar’s lawyers subject to the continuing authority of the
Myanmar state. Aspirations to allow greater independence for
Myanmar lawyers outside state control calls for attention to the

1158

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:4

legal constraints on the legal profession. Such a call implies that the
work to create ILAM was only part of a need for broader reforms
of Myanmar’s legal system as a whole and that efforts to promote
ideas like ILAM need to be seen as an element of a larger suite of
strategies to foster change. Specifically, the case of ILAM shows
that the transplantation of a legal idea requires more than just the
installation of a legal institution but rather a concert of activities
encompassing a holistic overview of coordinated reforms that
bring systemic change sufficient to allow the growth and
realization of the transplanted idea.
The topic of large-scale change to support the promotion of
international ideals points to directions for further research. In
particular, sociology literature provides a body of scholarship
addressing transnational means of large-scale change, with
potential areas of research on transnational social movements,
transnational
advocacy
networks,
and
cross-border
intermediaries that detail how international ideas are propagated
into local contexts.108 Hence, it would be worthwhile to explore the
potential for the literature in these areas to offer potential insights
for the field of legal transplants, particularly with respect to nonstate legal transplants.
Another potential direction for further studies is with respect
to historical analysis. The IBAHRI’s efforts to create ILAM was part
of an effort to reform the status quo of Myanmar laws regarding
the legal profession. The Myanmar status quo, however, is a result
of reforms to laws that existed under British colonial rule, which in
turn were a reform of a pre-colonial legal system predating British
Burma. Such a series points to a succession of legal transplants
over time that raise the question as to the relationships and
legacies left by prior legal systems upon later ones. Following from
Teubner’s conceptions of legal transplants both changing and
being changed by local contexts, each legal system in history
influences society and thereby alters the context facing later legal
108. See generally TRANSNATIONAL PROTEST AND GLOBAL ACTIVISM (Donatella Della
Porta & Sidney Tarrow eds.) (2005); SIDNEY TARROW, THE NEW TRANSACTIONAL ACTIVISM
(2005); SANJEEV KHAGRAM, JAMES RIKER & KATHRYN SIKKINK, RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS:
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NETWORKS, AND NORMS (2002); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT
GARTH, THE IMPORT AND EXPORT OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES
IN NATIONAL PALACE WARS, IN ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES (David Nelken & Johannes Feest
eds., 2001); MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS (1998).
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transplants. In this case, the study of legal transplants would be
enriched by greater consideration of the longitudinal path of a
country’s legal history and unpacking of the connections between
different stages in the progression of legal systems encompassed
by that history.
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